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THE INDIANA TRUST CODE-APPLICATION TO
PRE-EXISTING TRUSTS
T. BRYAN UNDERWOOD, JR.*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1967, the Indiana General Assembly created a Trust Code
Study Commission to survey the laws of Indiana bearing upon
trusts and the administration of trusts charging the Commission
to draft and recommend legislation that would "provide for
standardized, unified and efficient creation, construction and ad-
ministration of trusts."1 Pursuant to this legislative mandate, the
Commission was organized and four years later submitted its re-
commended Trust Code to the Indiana General Assembly. 2 Passing
the Indiana Senate and House of Representatives by unanimous
vote, the Code was signed by the Governor on April 16, 1971, and
become effective on September 2, 1971.3
The Trust Code contains two general guidelines for the courts
to follow in applying and interpreting its provisions. The terms of
the trust instrument shall prevail unless clearly prohibited or re-
stricted by the Code,4 and the courts may turn to the report of the
Trust Code Study Commission for guidance.5
This article will explore the extent to which the provisions of
the Trust Code are to be applied to trusts created prior to its ef-
fective date, i.e., testamentary trusts of decedents dying prior there-
to and inter vivos trusts entered into prior thereto. This will neces-
sitate a consideration of the relevant language of the Trust Code,
* Assistant Dean and Associate Professor of Law, Indiana University School
of Law (Bloomington). B.A., College of Wooster, 1954; J.D., Ohio State Uni-
versity, 1956.
1. IND. CODE § 2-5-11-4 (1971).
2. For a discussion of the Commission's work and the general format of
its proposed final draft of the Trust Code, see Ard, A Proposed Trust Code for
Indiana-An Effort at Reform, 45 NOTRE DAME LAW. 427 (1970). Mr. Ard
served as Executive Secretary to the Trust Code Study Commission.
3. The Trust Code is found in IND. CODE §§ 30-4-1-1 through -6-13 (1971).
Broad in its coverage, the Code is divided into six chapters (General Provisions;
Creation of Trusts; Rights, Powers, Duties, Liabilities and Remedies of the
Parties to a Trust; Rights of Third Parties; Administration of a Trust; Pro-
cedure).
4. IND. CODE § 30-4-1-3 (1971); see White, Indiana Trust Code: When the
Trust and the Code Conflict, 47 IND. L.J. 481 (1972).
5. IND. CODE § 30-4-1-7 (1971).
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the Commission's Comments, general constitutional limitations and
judicial decisions, particularly those relating to the retrospective
application of trust statutes.
II. STATUTORY LANGUAGE AND
COMMISSION COMMENT
That the Commission and the Indiana legislature intended the
Trust Code to have some retrospective effect is clear. The statute
provides:
Except as provided elsewhere in this article, the
rules of law contained in this article shall apply to all
trusts created prior to the effective date of this act unless
to do so would:
(1) adversely affect a right given to any beneficiary;
(2) give a right to any beneficiary which he was not in-
tended to have when the trust was created;
(3) impose a duty or liability on any person which was
not intended to be imposed when the trust was
created; or
(4) relieve any person from any duty or liability im-
posed by the terms of the trust or under prior law.6
But the questions raised by the statute are numerous and trouble-
some. What is a "right"? When can it be said that a beneficiary has
been "given a right"? Was a particular duty or liability "intended
to be imposed" by a pre-existing trust instrument when the instru-
ment is silent but general trust law in the past imposed such a duty
or liability? Why only in subsection (4) is there a reference to
"prior law"? Does "prior law" include both statutory and case law?
If case law is included, what if there was no prior Indiana case law
or statute covering the imposition of the particular duty or liabi-
lity? Are we to read the statute so literally as to say that there can
be no change in rights, duties or liabilities under pre-existing
trusts whether imposed by the express terms of the instrument, the
ascertainable intention of either the testator or settlor, or in the
absence of either by trust law as heretofore defined by the legisla-
ture and courts? If so interpreted, the statute will have minimal,
if any, retrospective application. If this were intended, then one
could ask why any retrospective provisions at all?
The limiting language of the statute: "Except as provided
otherwise in this article," has little significance in view of the fact
that in only a very few sections of the Code is a pre-existing trust
expressly excepted from the operation of those particular sec-
tions.7
6. IND. CODE § 30-4-1-4 (1971).
7. See, e.g., IND. CODE § 30-4-3-7 (1971), which provides in part: "(a) Un-
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The Commission Comment to this section is arguably less
abstruse than the section. Nevertheless, its lack of specificity will
still be disappointing to trustees and, ultimately, the Indiana courts
when forced to choose between applying the prior Indiana trust
law and the new Code:
This article will affect the remedies of the parties
and the procedure not only for implementing the remedies
but for administering the trusts in general as to trusts
created prior to the effective date of this code. Under the
present law, a statute will not be applied retrospectively
unless the plain language of the statute indicates that it
was intended to be. However, the article will not be ap-
plied retrospectively if vested rights or obligations will be
affected or the retroactive operation would impose new
liabilities.8
Though the Comment fails to specify which individual Code
sections are to be applied retrospectively, it does serve two valuable
purposes. First, it makes clear the intention of the Commission
that the Code be retrospectively applied to remedies, procedure and
trust administration. Second, it indicates a general precept of the
Commission that if at some point a retrospective application would
affect vested rights or obligations or impose new liabilities, it
should not be so applied. Though this precept is generally har-
monious with Indiana judicial expression, 9 it, by itself, will not
less the terms of the trust provide otherwise, the trustee has a duty: . . . (4)
if a corporate trustee, not to purchase for or retain in the trust its own or a
parent or subsidiary corporation's stock, bonds or other capital securities:
Provided, however, the trustee may retain such securities already held in trusts
created prior to the effective date of this article." Id. (emphasis added). See also
IND. CODE § 30-4-5-20, -22 & -23 (1971) (Private Foundation Requirements).
8. Commission Comment to IND. CODE § 30-4-1-4 (1971) (citations omitted).
9. Indiana courts have long followed the principle that unless the legisla-
ture clearly expresses an intent to the contrary, statutes will be applied pro-
spectively and not retrospectively. See, e.g., Herrick v. Sayler, 245 F.2d 171
(7th Cir. 1957); Heekin Can Co. v. Porter, 221 Ind. 69, 46 N.E.2d 486 (1943);
Chadwick v. City of Crawfordsville, 216 Ind. 399, 24 N.E.2d 937 (1940) ; Creigh-
ton v. Schafer, 117 Ind. App. 518, 72 N.E.2d 360 (1947).
As to remedial statutes, however, the Indiana courts have been willing to
sanction retrospective application even though the statute does not by Its terms
provide for such retrospective application. See, e.g., Connecticut Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Talbot, 113 Ind. 373, 378, 378, 14 N.E. 586, 589 (1887), where the court
said:
This argument is supported upon the general proposition that
statutes are to be construed and applied prospectively, unless a contrary
intent is manifested in clear and unambiguous terms. This is un-
doubtedly the general rule, and it is sometimes held that, to work an
exception, the intent favoring retrospective application must affirma-
tively appear in the words of the statute. The better rule of construc-
[Vol. 6: 430
INDIANA TRUST CODE
provide easy answers to the questions the statute raises. One does
have the feeling, though, after reading the Code section, the Com-
ment, and the cases cited therein that the Commission is simply
saying to the Indiana courts: "Apply the Code retrospectively to
the extent constitutionally permissible."
III. CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRAINTS ON RETROSPECTIVE
APPLICATION OF STATUTES
Assuming that the above interpretation of the Comment is
reasonable, one is next tempted to review the variety of court deci-
sions struggling with the question of what is a "vested right" to be
protected under the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, or under article 1,
section 10 of the Constitution of the United States (denying the
power to states to pass laws impairing the obligation of contracts),
or under article 1, section 24 of the constitution of Indiana ("no ex
post facto law, or law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall
ever be passed") ; then, by applying the rule discerned, designate
the "rights" of trustees, beneficiaries and third parties created by
pre-existing trusts and, thus, protected from the Code. But, it is
submitted, such a review would be unproductive and, in fact, dis-
heartening.
One commentator over forty years ago concluded that a "vested
right" could not in fact be defined but only that a right could be
characterized as "vested" when not subject to destruction and not
"vested" when subject to destruction by retrospective legislation. 10
In a subsequent article the same commentator suggested that
though more definite rules are desirable to deal with this ques-
tion, the ultimate issue is that of weighing the public interest
against the reasonable expectations of the individuals concerned.
In other words, simply consider the reasons for and against apply-
ing legislation retrospectively."
More recently, another writer after a thoughtful and thorough
study of the approach of the United States Supreme Court to re-
tion, and the rule peculiarly applicable to remedial statutes, however,
is, that a statute must be so construed as to make it effect the evi-
dent purpose for which it was enacted, and if the reason of the statute
extends to past transactions, as well as to those in the future, then it
will be so applied, although the statute does not in terms so direct,
unless to do so would impair some vested right or violate some consti-
tutional guaranty.
See In re Smith, 115 Ind. App. 494, 60 N.E.2d 147 (1945).
10. Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 5 TFx. L. REv. 231 (1927).
11. Smith, Retroactive Laws and Vested Rights, 11, 6 TEx. L. REv. 409,
431 (1928).
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trospective legislation found that the great variety of factual situa-
tions could not be reduced to a single denominator but that one
factor appeared most often-the degree of reasonable reliance
placed by the parties on the law as it existed at the time of the con-
duct to be affected by the retrospective statutes. He, too, stressed
the importance of comparing the public interest served by the
statute and the countervailing unfairness possibly created by its
retrospective operation. 12
Though the Indiana courts, settlors, trustees, beneficiaries
and others interested in pre-existing trusts may find scant benefit
in a further consideration of the general judicial treatment of re-
trospective statutes, there are, nevertheless, a number of decisions
specifically dealing with the retrospective applications of trust
statutes that will be helpful.
IV. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF
UNIFORM PRINCIPAL AND INCOME ACT
The decisions which, perhaps, best illustrate the judicial at-
titudes toward the retrospective application of trust statutes are
those considering the legality of such an application of the Revised
Uniform Principal and Income Act (1962) .13
Traditionally, in determining whether a trustee should allocate
stock dividends to income or corpus, courts have adopted either the
so-called Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, or Kentucky rules or some
variation thereof.14 The Massachusetts rule simply regards all stock
dividends as capital and thus allocable to corpus. The Pennsylvania
rule looks to the time of the accumulation of the corporate earnings
from which the stock dividend was paid and, then, allocates ac-
cordingly as between corpus and income. The Kentucky rule calls
for just the opposite treatment from the Massachusetts rule-allo-
cate a stock dividend to income regardless of whether it represents
earnings before of during the time of the income beneficiary's
interest.
The Uniform Act adopts the Massachusetts rule and provides
for application of the Act to trusts in existence prior to the Act.
In some states previously following a different rule of allocation,
courts have been asked to decide the constitutionality of applying
the allocation rules of the Act retrospectively.' 5
12. Hochman, The Supreme Court and the Constitutionality of Retroactive
Legislation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 692, 727 (1960).
13. 7 UNIFoRM LAWS ANN. 633 (1970).
14. 3 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 236.3 (3d ed. 1967).
15, 7 UNIFOrtM LAWS ANN. 1987 (1970).
[Vol. 6 :430
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In 1949, in the case of In re Crawford's Estate,6 the Pennsyl-
vania supreme court dealt with this question. First determining
that it had possessed the power to adjudicate the right to "income"
as between the life tenant and remaindermen at the time it previ-
ously adopted the so-called Pennsylvania rule, the court went on to
hold that once "income" had been defined, the "income" as defined
became a vested property interest within the protective provisions
of the Pennsylvania constitution and the fourteenth amendment to
the Constitution of the United States. Thus, the court reasoned, the
legislature could not take away such "interest" from the life
tenant.17
The Wisconsin supreme court in what is now the leading case
on the subject refused to follow the lead of the Pennsylvania court.
In In re Allis'8 the life beneficiary claimed entitlement to
certain stock dividends on the basis of the court-adopted Pennsyl-
vania rule followed in Wisconsin since 1911. She argued that she
had a vested property right to the stock dividends which could not
be taken away by the legislature without violating the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the
United States. The remaindermen contended that under the terms
of Wisconsin's Uniform Principal and Income Act the stock divi-
dends were allocable to corpus. Citing the decision of the United
States Supreme Court in Tidal Oil Co. v. Flanagan,19 the court
pointed out that, had it decided to depart from the Pennsylvania
rule, adopt the Massachusetts rule and apply the latter to pre-exis-
ting trusts, it could constitutionally have done so. The legislature,
the court said, could similarly reverse the court's earlier decision.
The court went on to find that testatrix in using the term
"income" in her will creating the testamentary trust could not be
said to have adopted the Pennsylvania rule; if any intention at all
could be presumed it was that she intended that the allocation be
made in accordance with the law as from time to time established
16. 362 Pa. 458, 67 A.2d 124 (1949).
17. Crawford was subsequently followed in In re Pew, 362 Pa. 468, 67 A.2d
129 (1949).
18. 6 Wis. 2d 1, 94 N.W.2d 226 (1959); see 73 HARV. L. R-v. 605 (1960).
See also the discussion of Allis in King, Uniform Principal and Income Act,
§ 5: Constitutionality of Its Retroactive Applications, 1960 WASH. U.L.Q. 339.
19. 263 U.S. 444 (1928), holding that a decision of a state supreme court
deciding against a party claiming a property or contract right under an earlier
decision of the court and reversing such earlier decision did not deprive such
party of property without due process of law contrary to the fourteenth amend-
ment nor amount to an impairment of contract under the impairment of con-
tracts clause of the Constitution of the United States.
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by court decision or legislative action. The court concluded that the
life beneficiary of a trust had no vested property right in the earn-
ings of a corporation before the declaration of a dividend and,
therefore, had no vested property right in the judicial rule govern-
ing the allocation of corporate stock dividends in effect at the date
of the death of the testatrix. 20
Following the Allis decision, the Pennsylvania supreme court
was asked to review its holdings in Crawford and In re Pew's
Estate.2 1 In In re Catherwood Trust22 the Pennsylvania court sur-
prisingly overruled its holdings, finding there can be no vested
property rights in a court-made rule of apportionment. The
Catherwood opinion indicates that the court was influenced to some
considerable extent by the difficulties trustees were experiencing in
contending with two rules-applying the Pennsylvania rule to
trusts created prior to a certain date and the Uniform Act with its
Massachusetts rule to trusts created after that date.28
In the judicial decisions supporting the retrospective applica-
tion of the Uniform Act the reliance principle is explicit in some
and implicit in others. In other words, what right does a benefici-
ary have to assume that the relevant trust law of a state, whether
legislative or judicial, will not be changed during the time the trust
is undergoing administration? Is it not reasonable to conclude that
if the beneficiaries or the settlor considered at all the possibilities
of changes in the law governing the allocation of stock dividends,
they assumed the law as changed from time to time would govern
the trust relationship? If so, the beneficiaries are said to have no
so-called "vested rights.124 The courts in this area show little in-
terest in discussing what reliance a settlor may reasonably place on
the continuation of the law in effect at the time the trust was
created.
20. 6 Wis. 2d at 11-12 n.18, 94 N.W.2d at 232 n.18.
21. See notes 16 & 17 supra.
22. 405 Pa. 61, 173 A.2d 86 (1961).
23. Unfortunately, the seemingly clear import of the holding in Catherwood
that the Massachusetts rule in the Uniform Act was to be applied to all trusts
was clouded two years later by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania in In re
Pew, 411 Pa. 96, 191 A.2d 399 (1963). There the court limited its Catherwood
opinion to the apportionment of proceeds from the sale of stock and of extra-
ordinary stock dividends pursuant to the Uniform Act, but approved the con-
tinuation of the long-standing Pennsylvania rule that small stock dividends of
six per cent or less are payable to the income beneficiary.
24. For other cases in accord with Allis, see Manufacturer's Hanover Trust
Co. v. Bartram, 158 Conn. 48, 255 A.2d 828 (1969). Contra, Franklin v. Margay
Oil Corp., 194 Okla. 519, 153 P.2d 486 (1944); In re Gardner, 266 Minn. 127, 123
N.W.2d 69 (1963).
[Vol. 6:430
INDIANA TRUST CODE
V. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF STATUTES
GOVERNING INVESTMENTS BY TRUSTEE
In a few cases where legislatures have amended statutes
governing the permissible investments of trustees, the argument
has been advanced that the creator of a trust intends that only
those investments lawful under the law existing at the time the
trust was established could be made thereafter. Thus, the argu-
ment continues, any later legislative attempt to broaden such in-
vestments by the adoption, for example, of the "prudent man" in-
vestment rule would be an impairment of contract or the taking
away of vested rights contrary to the Constitution of the United
States. These constitutional attacks have generally been rejected
by the courts.
In Fidelity Union Trust Company v. Price,25 for example, a
trustee sought a declaratory judgment as to the constitutionality
and applicability of the New Jersey Prudent Man Investment
Statute. The statute expanded the types of investments which a
fiduciary lawfully could make provided such investments not there-
tofore deemed legal could not exceed forty per cent of the trust
corpus and further provided the trust instrument did not specify
otherwise. By its terms, the statute applied to trusts created prior
to its enactment as well as to those created thereafter. In sustain-
ing the constitutionality of applying the statute retrospectively,
the court held that in the absence of a contrary intention in the
trust or a court order, a New Jersey trustee may invest in such
investments as are legal or permitted by statutes at the time the
investments are made. As the rationale for this holding, the court
went on to say:
Unless the trust instrument provides otherwise, it
is presumed that the trustor intended that his trustee
should have the power to make such investments of the
corpus of the trust as the legislature might from time to
time permit.2 1
Here, again, we find a court looking back to the time of the
creation of the trust to determine what was intended. Finding no
contrary intention expressed in the instrument, the court is quite
willing to presume the intention that the investmefits conform only
to the law existing at the time they are made. Is not the court also
saying, in effect, that such intention, once presumed, precludes as
unreasonable any reliance by beneficiaries or settlors on the law as
it was at the time of the trust's creation? Other jurisdictions have
reached similar results. 27
25. 11 N.J. 90, 93 A.2d 321 (1952).
26. Id. at 99, 93 A.2d at 325.
27. See Mechanicks Nat'l Bank of Concord v. Brady, 100 N.H. 469, 129 A.2d
19731
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VI. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF STATUTES
GOVERNING COMPENSATION OF TRUSTEES
When the statutory rate of compensation for trustees has
been increased by legislative action, the question of whether a trus-
tee of a pre-existing trust is entitled to the new increased compen-
sation has often been raised. Generally, the courts have applied the
compensation statute effective at the time compensation is to be
awarded and not the statute in effect at the time the trust was
created.28 The expressed theory of such cases is usually that a fidu-
ciary's right to a definite rate of compensation is not "vested" at
the time of the decedent's death or the creation of the trust or the
commencement of fiduciary duties but becomes "vested" only when
by court order the amount of compensation is determined. At that
time, the court is to follow the compensation law then in effect.2
Little mention is made of the intention of the settlor or reliance by
the beneficiaries.
The Pennsylvania courts have, however, been reluctant to em-
brace the general rule in toto, finding under certain fact situa-
tions constitutional barriers in the fourteenth amendment to the
Constitution of the United States. The Pennsylvania legislature,
in 1945, repealed a portion of a 1917 act which had prohibited the
same person from receiving commissions both as an executor and
as a trustee. A corporate trustee of a testamentary trust created
by the will of a decedent dying in 1930 was paid an executor's
commission prior to the commencement of its duties as the testa-
mentary trustee. The trustee, after the passage of the 1945 act,
sought compensation for its services as a trustee since the inception
of the trust contending that the 1945 act should be applied retro-
spectively. The Pennsylvania supreme court in the case of In re
Williamson's Estate"° refused to apply the 1945 act retrospectively
holding that in 1930 the corporate fiduciary accepted the trust and
its executor's commission under the law as it then existed and that
the rights, liabilities and expectancies of the life tenant and re-
857 (1957) (holding that the retrospective application of the Uniform Common
Trust Fund Act to a testamentary charitable trust in existence prior to the
Act was proper); Citizens National Bank v. Morgan, 94 N.H. 284, 51 A.2d 841
(1947) (approving the retrospective application of a statute empowering a court
to permit a trustee on specific grounds to deviate from the terms of a trust on
theory that substantive rights were not affected, but only trust administration) ;
Goodridge v. National Bank of Commerce of Norfolk, 200 Va. 511, 106 S.E.2d
598 (1959) (upholding the retrospective application of 1956 prudent man statute
to a 1940 trust).
28. 3 A. ScoTT, TUE LAW OF TRuSTS § 242 (3d ed. 1967).
29. See, e.g., In re Donovan, 266 Mich. 362, 253 N.W. 552 (1934).
30. 368 Pa. 343, 82 A.2d 49 (1951).
438 [Vol. 6:430
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maindermen having thereby become fixed, an additional compen-
sation pursuant to a retrospective application of the statute would
violate the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States.
Williamson's Estate should, however, be limited to the par-
ticular factual situation therein considered. The executor-trustee
had previously been paid a judicially approved full compensation
under a repealed statute for its past services as an executor and
future services as a trustee. The case should not stand as authority
for a proposition that the compensation statute in effect at the time
of the trust's creation establishes "vested rights. ' '8 1
The Pennsylvania supreme court, in apparent recognition of
this distinction, later expressly limited the application of
Williamson's Estate. In the case of In re Ehret, 2 the court re-
troactively applied a 1953 act to a 1913 testamentary trust. The
1953 act, by providing for interim commissions on principal to
trustees, changed the case law in Pennsylvania which prior to that
time had generally prohibited the payment of compensation to
trustees before the termination of the trust. The court distin-
guished its prior decisions and held that in the absence of a control-
ling provision in the trust, there is no vested right in a beneficiary
in the continuation of a judicially created rule forbidding interim
commissions and permitted the payment of an interim commission.
VII. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF STATUTES
GOVERNING SPENDTHRIFT TRUSTS
When legislatures have attempted to change in some way the
31. See Comment, The Constitutionality of Retroactive Trustee Compensa-
tion Statutes in Pennsylvania, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 530, 536 (1966), wherein the
author states:
The interest of the trust beneficiary that would be affected by the
award of a second principal commission is somewhat different from
that which has been affected by the retroactive trustee compensation
statutes held constitutional in other jurisdictions. The difference
arises from the fact that the retroactive statutes in other Jurisdictions
were applied to services for which a court had not before determined
the proper amount of compensation, while in the case of the executor-
trustee seeking a second principal commission there has been a prior
court determination of the value of all the fiduciary's services and an
award of that full amount. Even where the application of new rates
of compensation to established trusts has been held constitutional,
courts have occasionally recognized this distinction. They have re-
fused to apply the new rate to services for which compensation was
granted in a past decree, usually on the theory that the awards were
res judicata.
32. 427 Pa. 584, 235 A.2d 414 (1967).
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legal effect of protective provisions in pre-existing spendthrift
trusts, the courts have reached different conclusions on the con-
stitutionality of the retrospective application of such statutes.
3
1
The General Assembly of Tennessee passed a statute in 1943
subjecting the interests of beneficiaries in spendthrift trusts to
claims of the State of Tennessee whether or not the debt was
created or the trust established prior to the effective date of the
statute. The Tennessee supreme court in State v. CaldwellJ 34 held
that a state statute of 1832 supporting the validity of spendthrift
trusts was a rule of property, not an exemption statute, and found
that the beneficiaries of spendthrift trusts therefore had vested
estates therein which could not be disturbed by later acts of the
legislature. The court concluded that the 1943 statute was an
invalid infringement of the rights of the beneficiaries as protected
by the fourteenth amendment and article I, section 10, of the Con-
stitution of the United States3
The opposite result was reached in Bearley School v. Ward.36
In that case at the time a testamentary trust was created the bene-
ficiary's interest was statutorily protected from claims of his cred-
itors. Subsequently, the New York legislature amended the statute
so as to subject a portion of trust income to execution by judgment
creditors of the beneficiary. The argument advanced on behalf of
the beneficiary was that as soon as the trust was created, the bene-
ficiary became "entitled" to the entire income therefrom and the
legislature could not constitutionally take away any part thereof.
Taking the position that statutes affording protection to trust
beneficiaries are statutes of exemption, the New York Court of
Appeals held that to limit or lessen such exemption was not an
unconstitutonal impairment of contract but, in fact, a strengthen-
ing of a contract, assuming that some sort of a "contract" existed.
The court further found that there had been no taking of property
without due process of law on the theory that there can be no
vested right in statutory privileges and exemptions such as are
inherent in statutes exempting property from levy and execution. 7
33. 2 A. Scowt, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 152.1 (3d ed. 1967).
34. 181 Tenn. 74, 178 S.W.2d 624 (1944).
35. See also In re Borsch, 362 Pa. 581, 67 A.2d 119 (1949), holding that a
statute permitting a beneficiary of a pre-existing spendthrift trust to release or
disclaim his interest in favor of a remainderman violated the constitutional
property rights of the donor of the trust.
.36. 201 N.Y. 358, 94 N.E. 1001 (1910).
37. See also Wilmington Trust Co. v. Carpenter, 39 Del. Ch. 314, 163 A.2d
[Vol. 6: 430
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VIII. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION OF STATUTES
GOVERNING COURT SUPERVISION OF TRUSTS
What is the effect of a state statute changing the procedure
for the judicial supervision of trusts created prior to the effective
date of the statute? A case arising in Oklahoma provides a strong
answer.
In 1941 Oklahoma enacted a comprehensive Trust Act which,
inter abia, provided:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction to
construe the provisions of any trust instrument; to de-
termine the law applicable thereto; the powers, duties,
and liability of the trustee; the existence or nonexistence
of facts affecting the administration of the trust estate;
to require accounting by trustees; to surcharge trustees;
and in its discretion to supervise the administration of
trusts; and all actions hereunder are declared to be pro-
ceedings in rem. 8
The Act was made applicable to:
A. All agreements containing trust provisions en-
tered into subsequent to the effective date hereof;
B. All wills made by testators who shall die sub-
sequent to the effective date hereof;
C. All other wills and trust agreements and trust
relations in so far as such terms do not impair the obliga-
tion of contract or deprive persons of property without
due process of law under the Constitution of the State of
Oklahoma or the United States of America.39
In 1947, a beneficiary of a testamentary trust created by the
will of a decedent dying in 1937 filed an action in the United States
District Court, Eastern District of Oklahoma, seeking the removal
of the trustee, an accounting by the trustee, a construction of the
will and the fixing of definite sums to be paid to the beneficiary.
The court sustained the motion of the trustee to dismiss the suit on
the theory that the state district court of Muskogee County, Okla-
homa, had exclusive jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof by
578 (1960), aff'd, 39 Del. Ch. 528, 168 A.2d 306 (1961), notecd in 18 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 283 (1961), holding that a statute permitting a beneficiary of a spend-
thrift trust to assign a portion of his trust income to a charity was, when ap-
plied retrospectively, a reasonable modification of the spendthrift trust provi-
sions. The court expressly held that the settlor had no property interest in the
enforcement of spendthrift conditions.
38. OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.23 (1971).
39. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 60, § 175.53 (1971).
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INDIANA LAW REVIEW
the terms of the Oklahoma Trust Act. The Court of Appeals for
the Tenth Circuit affirmed the dismissal, holding that because sec-
tion 175.23 of the Act4" deprived no one of a substantive right but
simply provided new remedies, it could be applied constitutionally
to trusts created prior to the effective date of the Act.4" The court
explained that there can be no vested right in a method of pro-
cedure and that so long as the remedy provided by the legislature
is not unreasonable or arbitrary but substantial and efficient, due
process of law is not offended by the change in remedy. 42 Here,
the court was not so concerned about intention and reliance but
only with the question of whether the statutory provisions con-
sidered were procedural or substantive.
IX. RETROSPECTIVE APPLICATION
OF STATUTES OF FRAUDS
Though not as directly related to trust administration, the
question of the constitutionality of the retrospective application of
statutes of frauds should be considered in view of the fact that the
Indiana Trust Code has added a requirement, new to Indiana law,
that trusts in personal property must be in writing to be enforce-
able:
A trust in either real or personal property is en-
forceable only if there is written evidence of its terms
bearing the signature of the settlor or his authorized
agent.43
The Commission's reason for adding trusts in personal pro-
perty to the Indiana Statute of Frauds is well reflected in its Com-
ment:
The decision to require a trust in personal property
to be substantiated by written evidence is motivated by
the Commission's concern for the risk that manufactured
evidence might be used to enforce an oral trust. This
risk has been recognized in Indiana. It is believed that
the rules relating to trusts created by operation of law
provide a sufficient remedy to avoid injustice in most
oral trust cases.
4 4
But as is true throughout most of the Trust Code, the Coin-
40. See note 38 supra.
41. Swanson v. Bates, 170 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1948); see also Swanson v.
Bates, 202 Okla. 128, 211 P.2d 781 (1949).
42. 170 F.2d at 650-51.
43. IND. CODE § 30-4-2-1 (1971).
44. Commission Comment to IND. CODE § 30-4-2-1 (1971) (citation omitted).
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mission failed to specify the effect this particular section is to have
on pre-existing oral trusts in personal property. One can note that
the section does not purport to make oral trusts in personal
property void but merely unenforceable and from there argue that
the section is remedial, not substantive, and intended by the Com-
mission and legislature, therefore, to be applied retrospectively.-9
Assuming that this section is intended to apply retrospectively,
the question of the constitutionality of such application is a dif-
ficult one. Courts have differed sharply on the question.
In some cases, the statute of frauds being examined has been
construed as remedial and, therefore, applicable to agreements
entered into prior to the effective date of the statute.4 6 More
commonly, however, courts have refused to afford retro-
spective effect to statutes of frauds on the theory that to do so
would be an unconstitutional impairment of contract or deprivation
of vested rights.4 7 This has been the result in a number of cases
even where the statutes have contained remedial language, e.g.,
"no action shall be brought" or "parol evidence shall not be re-
ceived" on the theory that to take away the remedy is to destroy
the contract.48
Indiana courts have, generally, interpreted the basic Indiana
Statute of Frauds49 as not rendering oral contracts within its pro-
visions void but merely unenforceable."' If these holdings can be
characterized as saying that the Indiana Statute of Frauds is re-
medial and not substantive, as noted earlier, it could be argued
rather persuasively that the Commission and legislature likewise
regarded the Trust Code Statute of Frauds as remedial and in-
tended therefore, to be applied retrospectively. For the Indiana
45. See Commission Comment to IND. CODE § 30-4-1-4 (1971).
46. See, e.g., Schoenl v. Warner-White Co., 32 Ohio App. 59, 167 N.E. 598,
petition ol error dismissed, 119 Ohio St. 460, 164 N.E. 534 (1928).
47. See, e.g., McGavock v. Ducharme, 192 Mich. 98, 158 N.W. 173 (1916);
Ralph v. Cronk, 266 N.Y. 428, 195 N.E. 139 (1934). In both cases the statutes
rendered the oral agreements void and not simply unenforceable.
48. See, e.g., Hutchings v. Slemons, 141 Tex. 448, 454, 174 S.W.2d 487, 490
(1943), wherein the court said:
[T]o deny the broker the right to file suit and to offer evidence of
his valid parol contract through remedial legislation is to destroy the
very contract which was valid and binding at the time it was made.
This, in our opinion, is condemned by the Constitution.
49. IND. CODE § 32-2-1-1 et seq. (1971). Section 32-2-1-1 commences: "No
action shall be brought in any of the following cases ... "
50. Hadley v. Kays, 121 Ind. App. 112, 98 N.E.2d 237 (1951); Humphrey v.
Johnson, 73 Ind. App. 551, 127 N.E. 819 (1920); Porter v. Patterson, 42 Ind.
App. 404, 85 N.E. 797 (1908).
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courts to support such retrospective application, however, would
require their taking a position contrary to that of the majority
holdings in other jurisdictions.51
X. CONCLUSION
It is indeed regrettable that neither the Indiana legislature nor
the Commission has provided to the courts and those concerned
with the day-by-day administration of trusts understandable statu-
tory language specifically stating which sections of the Code are
intended to apply to pre-existing trusts.
Perhaps it would be unreasonable to expect the Commission
and legislature to have resolved, in advance, all constitutional ques-
tions. But, at the least, they could have shown some additional fore.
sight and responsibility and said in the Code what the Comment
indicates was meant, namely, "The Trust Code is to apply to all
pre-existing trusts to the extent constitutionaly permisible."
Though by according this interpretation to the statute, it is
still not possible to anticipate, identify and resolve now every con-
ceivable type of case which might present the retrospective ques-
tion. The preceding discussion will, it is hoped, provide the courts
with the basis for the development of rational guidelines for the
resolution of such questions. It is suggested that a court first look
to the terms of the instrument for any expressed intention that the
settlor or testator intended that the particular rule of law then
in effect should always be applied even though the law should
thereafter be changed. If such an expression is found, it would
seem that, generally, the Code requires compliance with it.52
Secondly, the court should recognize that the public interest of
the State of Indiana will be served best by a uniform, orderly and
consistent administration of trusts in accordance with the new
Trust Code regardless of when such trusts came into existence.
Thirdly, in the absence of an expressed intention in the instru-
ment calling for the application of prior law, the court should con-
sider the relevant equities of the litigants resisting retrospective
application of the Code to a particular set of facts vis-a-vis the
public interest. What reliance can litigants be said to have placed
on the continuance of the law as it existed at the time of the trust's
creation? What were their reasonable expectations? What
"right" do they have to assume that the legal relationships existing
between trustees, beneficiaries, third parties, etc., will never be
changed throughout the duration of a trust that might last one
hundred years or so?
51. See notes 47 & 48 supra.
52. See note 4 supra.
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If these guidelines are applied, it is hoped that in most cases
the Indiana courts will find constitutional objections to the retro-
spective application of the Trust Code to be insufficient to override
the public interest just as have many other courts in trust situa-
tions. However, until the Indiana courts have evidenced their atti-
tude toward retrospective application of the Trust Code, the cau-
tious trustee of a pre-existing trust faced with a question of whether
to utilize the new Trust Code or to rely on prior law may well de-
cide to seek instructions from the court.2
53. IND. CODE § 30-4-3-18 (1971), provides in part: "If there is a reasonable
doubt with respect to any matter relating to the administration of the trust, the
trustee is entitled to be instructed by the court."
